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RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 162240
Present: |
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- versus - |
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. |
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LEONARDO BITHAO, Respondent. |
Promulgated: August 29, 2006 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation seeking the nullification of the Resolution[1] dated
The facts are not in dispute.
Respondent Leonardo Bithao
filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint docketed
as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-07759-94 for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
recovery of 13th month pay, rice subsidy and salary differential,
damages, and attorney’s fees. After the
parties submitted their pleadings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, in
this wise:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant as
follows:
1.
Declaring the suspension and eventual
dismissal of the complainant illegal;
2.
Ordering the respondents to immediately
reinstate the complainant to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and other benefits;
3.
Ordering the respondents to pay to complainant
his backwages and other benefits appurtenant to his position;
4.
Ordering respondents to pay complainant moral
and exemplary damages of P150,000.00 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of
the total amount due.
Attached
is the detailed computation which is marked as annexes “A”, “A-1”, “A-2”, “A-3”
of the backwages and other benefits per collective bargaining agreement as of
SO
ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation appealed to the NLRC. However,
except for deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On
Upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed another Motion to Dismiss which the appellate court granted. The petition was thus declared closed and terminated.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that the amount he received from petitioner under the quitclaim
represented only his retirement pay and benefits, and not the backwages awarded
by the Labor Arbiter.
Meanwhile, the NLRC
granted the Satisfaction of Judgment and declared the case closed and
terminated. It also denied respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals granted
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal on the ground that:
THE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTION
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT, AND ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MONETARY AWARDS
IN THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER DATED 28 JANUARY 1999 AND AS AFFIRMED IN
THE RESOLUTION OF THE NLRC DATED 31 AUGUST 1999, WERE NOT DEEMED INCLUDED AND
WAIVED BY THE RESPONDENT IN THE QUITCLAIM.[4]
Petitioner
claims that, (1) when respondent executed the quitclaim, the decisions of both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were still pending review by the Court of Appeals;
(2) respondent expressly acknowledged and waived in the quitclaim all amounts due him based on
the Labor Arbiter’s decision in NLRC NCR Case No. NCR-00-10-07759-94, and the
NLRC’s resolution in CA No. 019714-99; and (3) respondent voluntarily
executed the quitclaim, with full knowledge of its terms and consequences.
It is
worthy of note that the Court of Appeals ruled that the amount received by
respondent represented only his early retirement benefits and other (additional)
benefits because no specific amount was allocated specifically for the Labor
Arbiter’s judgment award. It further
held that respondent was merely forced to sign the quitclaim because petitioner
withheld the release of his retirement benefits unless he signed the quitclaim.
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of
law, not of fact, may be raised before this Court.[5]
We have consistently reiterated that the
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The only time this Court will disregard the appellate
court’s factual findings, which are accorded great respect, is when these are
based on speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on
substantial evidence.[6]
In the
present petition, we find no reason to depart from the appellate court’s
factual findings. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the amount received by respondent represented only payment
for his early retirement benefits and other (additional) benefits since no
amount was specifically allocated for the Labor Arbiter’s judgment award. There is nothing to support the claim that the
judgment award was included in the amount received by respondent. The amount
received merely refers to respondent’s early retirement benefits and other
benefits. The Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, reads in part:
I, LEONARDO R. BITHAO, of legal age, Filipino and
with address at Blk. 35, Lot 10 Phase 1A Kaunlaran Village, Navotas, Metro
Manila do, by these presents, acknowledge that I have agreed to receive the
amount of P1,295,998.16 as full and final settlement of any and all
claims I may have against the Bank arising from or connected with my previous
employment with it and/or the cessation of my said employment, including all
amounts due me by reason of Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes’s Decision
dated 28 January 1999 in Case No. NCR-00-10-07759-94 and the NLRC’s Resolution
dated
In
consideration of my receipt of the above amounts and benefits –
1. I
acknowledge that the amounts specified below set forth payment of all amounts
and benefits due me or my heirs from the Bank arising from my separation from
the Bank or any agreement, contract or plan or in respect of any matter
incident to or arising from my previous employment with the Bank or the
cessation of my employment with it:
Early
Retirement Benefits P 968,025.40
Additional Benefits P 327,972.76
Total Payment P1,295,998.16[7]
x
x x x
Respondent’s
quitclaim to the effect that the amount stated therein was the full and final
settlement of all his claims, including all the amounts due him by reason of the
decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, does not mean that he actually
received the judgment award. Very clearly, the same document
indicates that the amount was only for his early retirement benefits and
additional benefits. Nowhere does the
document say that a portion of the sums received pertain to the judgment award.
We are also unconvinced by petitioner’s claim
that respondent could not have retired on P1,295,998.16 included
the judgment award,[9]
then petitioner should not have withheld the amount pending the Court of
Appeals’ decision, for after all, as they claim, the amount P1,295,998.16
already included the judgment award.[10]
Moreover, we are inclined to agree with the appellate
court that petitioner took undue advantage of respondent’s predicament and dire
financial needs to let him sign the quitclaim in exchange for his retirement
benefits.[11] The subordinate position of the individual
employee vis-à-vis management renders him especially vulnerable to the employer’s
financial importuning, and at times even intimidation. In certain cases, we note that the desperate family
situation of an employee forces him to improvidently waive his benefits. Thus, we have always looked upon quitclaims,
waivers or releases with disfavor for being contrary to public policy, hence
ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers’ legal rights.[12]
In Periquet
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13]
however, we clarified
the standards for determining the validity of a waiver, release and quitclaim as follows:
Not
all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may
not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from
an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking. . . .
In the
instant case, when the quitclaim was executed, petitioner’s appeal before the
Court of Appeals was still pending. Since
both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have previously ruled in respondent’s favor,
petitioner was aware of the slim chances it had before the appellate court. Under these circumstances, when the quitclaim
was offered and accepted, petitioner could not deny that the quitclaim was in
its own interest. For respondent, it was
not so. The Latin maxim renuntiatio non praesumitur,[14] in our view, applies in this instance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated
Consequently, the Resolutions of the
NLRC dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 35-41. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes, and Rodrigo V. Cosico
concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 223-237.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 235-247.
[4] Rollo, p. 18.
[5] See Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127703,
January 18, 2002, 374 SCRA 86, 92; National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 195, 208; New Sampaguita Builders Construction,
Inc. (NSCIB) v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July
30, 2004, 435 SCRA 565, 579-580; Solangon v. Salazar, G.R. No. 125944, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 379,
383.
[6] Samahan
ng Magsasaka sa San Josep v. Valisno, G.R. No. 158314, June 3, 2004, 430
SCRA 629, 635.
[7] Records, p. 362.
[8] Rollo, p. 69.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Lambo v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 111042,
[13] G.R. No. 91298,
[14] “A waiver of rights is not presumed.” ACD Investigation Security Agency, Inc. v. Daquera, G.R. No. 147473, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 494, 501.